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CODIB-D-111/1.7/2
12 May 1965

UNITED   STATES   INTELLIGENCE   BOARD

COMMITTEE ON DOCUMENTATION

Analyst Communication Task Team VII

Approved Terms of Reference

The attached paper reflects CODIB discussion of and action

on the draft CODIB-D-111/1.7/1 of 1 March 1965, as described in

CODIB-M-62, 11 May 1965, para. 5 g.

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Secretary

Group 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification.

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TASK TEAM VII - ANALYST COMMUNICATION

Terms of Reference

I. OBJECTIVES

A. To study present practices and procedures in the field of intelligence analyst-to-analyst communications to ascertain whether improvement is required; and, if required, to develop proposals to facilitate the exchange between analysts of substantive information and personal judgment and expertise.

B. To determine, inter alia, the feasibility of establishing a centralized Intelligence Community directory service as an aid in any program for improvement.

II. SCOPE

A. All intelligence producing components of USIB agencies that produce finished intelligence, basic, current, or estimative are within the scope of this problem. Organizations under contract to a USIB agency, non-USIB elements, or the Unified and Specified Commands and their components are not included at this time, but the Task Team should recommend whether these should be included in a subsequent phase.

B. Analysts performing current, basic, and estimative intelligence analysis are to be included.

C. With regard to a centralized Intelligence Community directory service, the work of Task Team VII should supplement rather than duplicate the work of Task Team IX.

D. All practical communications methods, including voice, image and message transmission at all appropriate security levels should be considered in connection with the improvement of analyst-to-analyst communication.

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III. TASKS

A. Identify all organizations within the scope of this problem.

B. Identify and describe existing practices, procedures, and facilities for analyst-to-analyst communication.

C. Determine need for improvement in communications between analysts in these organizations.

D. Determine and describe various procedures and facilities that could be utilized to meet a need for enhanced communications between analysts.

E. Identify procedures and facilities to be adopted to provide the necessary improvement of communications, including appropriate equipment and the location thereof.

F. Determine methods and feasibility of collecting, publishing and maintaining data that would facilitate analyst-to-analyst communication, including identification of each.

G. Prepare appropriate recommendation to CODIB on the foregoing.

IV. MEMBERSHIP

A member familiar with intelligence production practices and procedures should be designated by each USIB agency. Other agencies may be invited to participate if the Task Team believes they have an ability to contribute to the effort. Members will require appropriate 1/ security clearances and should have broad knowledge of intelligence analysis activities within their respective agencies. The CODIB Support Staff will provide a member who will also act as Secretary.

V. GUIDANCE

A. This Task Team will be under the general guidance of CODIB. The Chief of the CODIB Support Staff will coordinate the work of this Task Team with the work of other Task Teams and will provide continuity of guidance in between the CODIB meetings.

B. In approaching its assigned tasks, this Task Team should take into consideration:

1. Advantages of improved analyst-to-analyst communications such as

a. Cross-fertilization

1/ See CODIB-M-59, paragraph 5.

b. Making available unique information, knowledge or expertise
c. Avoidance of duplicatory research

2. Disadvantages and dangers such as

a. "False" coordination
b. Bypassing command channels and command control
c. Premature revelation of policy
d. Breakdown of security

3. Operational problems such as

a. Identification of right individual
b. Locating individual
c. Physical means of contact--personal visit, telephone, grey line, etc.
d. Determination of security clearance (two way)
e. Discussion of controlled info-Limdis, Exdis, CS-DB, etc.
f. Encouragement of analyst-to-analyst communication.